The United States District for the Middle District of Florida conditionally certified a class of loan officers in an FLSA action seeking unpaid overtime. The Court applied the lenient standard for notice stage certification and required the Plaintiffs to show (1) that there are other employees who desire to opt into the action, and (2) that those employees are similarly situated.
The Plaintiffs submitted nineteen declarations showing that the putative class members all engaged in cold calling to prospective customers, trying to sell loans to customers, and completing loan applications. The Defendants claimed that differences existed from branch to branch, including differences in job title and job duties. The Court found that such variations were factual issues that are not considered at the notice stage. The Court also disregarded the Defendants' assertion that decisions regarding classification of loan officers are made at the branch level, rather than the corporate level. The Florida Court noted that the existence of a common policy or plan is relevant to whether judicial economy would be served by a collective action and that such issues are more appropriately addressed at the decertification stage.
The Court, apparently sua sponte, noted that the class to be noticed was larger than Plaintiffs request for all “loan officers.” Therefore, the Court defined the class based on specific job duties rather than on job title.
The case is Vondriska v. Premier Mortgage Funding, Inc., 564 F.Supp.2d 1330(M.D.Fla. May 10, 2007).
The Plaintiffs submitted nineteen declarations showing that the putative class members all engaged in cold calling to prospective customers, trying to sell loans to customers, and completing loan applications. The Defendants claimed that differences existed from branch to branch, including differences in job title and job duties. The Court found that such variations were factual issues that are not considered at the notice stage. The Court also disregarded the Defendants' assertion that decisions regarding classification of loan officers are made at the branch level, rather than the corporate level. The Florida Court noted that the existence of a common policy or plan is relevant to whether judicial economy would be served by a collective action and that such issues are more appropriately addressed at the decertification stage.
The Court, apparently sua sponte, noted that the class to be noticed was larger than Plaintiffs request for all “loan officers.” Therefore, the Court defined the class based on specific job duties rather than on job title.
The case is Vondriska v. Premier Mortgage Funding, Inc., 564 F.Supp.2d 1330(M.D.Fla. May 10, 2007).
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